SUNS4511 20 September 1999

Yugoslavia: The remedy that nearly killed the patient

Oslo, Sep 16 (IPS/Guri Wiggen) -- In Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) created a worse situation than what it was trying to fix, say a Norwegian general and a German expert in a new book on the war in Yugoslavia.

"If it was already known that (Yugoslav President Slobodan) Milosevic and part of his military apparatus were extremely brutal, it was quite obvious that bombing Serbia would lead to a spiral of violence," Wolfgang Biermann, one of the book's author's, told IPS.

"What do police in a civilian society do to secure the release of a group of kidnapped victims? They don't do what was done in Kosovo...The military strategy should have been an attempt at gaining control over the kidnapper, through well-planned military or police action," he added.

During the war over Kosovo, most of the media lost sight of their mission and contributed to an escalation of the conflict, maintain Biermann and Norwegian General Martin Vadset in "Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia".

Biermann, a peace adviser to Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), says many questions were left hanging after the Mar 24 to Jun 11 NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia.

NATO tried to provide a "quick fix" for the growing tension between Belgrade and the ethnic Albanian population of the Serbian province of Kosovo, says Biermann. But the situation got out of hand, and the bombings unleashed a massive "ethnic cleansing" campaign, he adds.

One of the immediate consequences of the airstrikes was Russia's decision to reinforce and upgrade its nuclear arsenals, "which could bring new nuclear threats in Europe," warns Biermann, who is involved in various human rights and peace projects in Scandinavia.

Biermann and Vadset's book is based on a research project on the role of the military in United Nations peacekeeping missions and the civilian population in the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia and Croatia).

"Most wars start when the dynamics of war itself are underestimated," says Biermann. In the case of Kosovo, the press could have carried out more investigative journalism to present a balanced view of the war, he maintains.

"In a survey of 1,000 UN officials with experience in the area of the former Yugoslavia, 75 percent believed the media influenced the course of war," he adds.

"A people at war always seek allies in the world. If people have access to the press in other countries, that has an influence on the parties involved. It is the foreign press which defines whether the country feels support or provocation."

According to Biermann, "all statements by politicians and press agencies or the TV have an enormous influence on the area of conflict." He says the Norwegian press generally maintained coverage aligned with NATO, contributing to a widespread impression that the bombings were legitimate, partly explained, he says, by the fact that "NATO is the only relevant organisation of which Norway is a member, apart from the UN."

In Norway, "I have read many reports on the conflict, the content of which varied. It was not only information against Serbia - the tendency in Germany - as provided by a more emotional press bound by cliches. In Germany, however, there have been more articles critical of NATO than what I have seen in Norway," he adds.
Biermann criticises the attitudes of governments towards dictators, which vary according to their political orientation. "The idea that 'he's a son-of-a-bitch, but he's our son-of-a- bitch' is unsustainable.

"Military power should not be resorted to, and if it has to be used, it should be focused on defusing combats, to de-escalate war," he says. One of the book's chief conclusions "is that we do not need more military intervention troops, but 'diplomatic troops' to negotiate conflicts.

"Many forgot that the UN implemented a peace accord in 1994 between the peoples (Serbs, Croatians and Moslems) of Bosnia, which at the time was a success. Unified political support is more important than a unified military command structure," says Biermann. "Massacres occurred in the Balkans during the
escalation of the conflict, which legitimated new killings," he points out.

The expert says the peace agreement reached in June - promoted by the European Union and Russia - ended up favouring Milosevic, because NATO lost the possibility to operate in Serb territory, as initially demanded.

Milosevic "fought against the world's top military power, and kept his word. At the same time, his practical power has diminished as he lost control over Kosovo. It remains risky for him to enjoy so much support in his own country," says Biermann.

NATO pushed the Serbs into backing Milosevic by pitting itself against Serbia, rather than seeking a balanced solution to the conflict, he maintains.

"The Serbs felt they were treated unfairly by the world. If the West wants to maintain moral authority, it should resolve problems outside of the Balkans - in Croatia and Turkey, for instance, which are carrying out ethnic cleansing" against Serbs and Kurds, says Biermann.

But he does not believe war can serve as a method to resolve human rights conflicts, as it mainly punishes the civilian population. "I was in Vietnam during the Balkan war, and everyone there remembers all too well what 'modern' airstrikes mean.

"If you study the effectiveness of the bombings, there are reports certifying that civilian damages were minimal. That also happened in Vietnam."