7:40 AM Dec 10, 1993

THEY ALSO SERVE WHO STAND AND WAIT

Geneva 10 Dec (Chakravarthi Raghavan) -- When the negotiations in the Uruguay Round are brought to a close before midnight (Washington time) of 15 December, Third World negotiators frustrated by the failure of their attempts to find interlocutors among their trading partners for market access negotiations, might perhaps remember the words of the blind English bard Milton about those who serve god by merely standing and waiting.

If they can shed their diplomatic protocols, they might even stand up and sing this line in chorus, as the GATT Director-General and TNC Chair Peter Sutherland gets through the business of the TNC on 15 December, in approving the Draft Final Act texts and annexes, and repeats the claims, fed to him by his econometric advisors and officials, about the gains to world trade and developing countries and the bright future ahead.

They can do little else: if they had been united, they could withhold their consensus, or at least collectively make clear that they don't join it and will decide their course of actions later collectively.

But this is ruled out.

Or, some of them could just take back all their "offers" in the market access in goods area (since their attempts to get benefits have failed), file a minimum schedule in services to qualify to join, and sit quiet. Perhaps a few might just do that.

But the rest would moan and groan outside, and wait for the promised benefits of the round, painted for them in various econometric projections to take place after 10 years.

Throughout these "global" negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and certainly over the last several weeks, developing country negotiators have been doing nothing but standing and waiting -- in their missions and in the GATT corridors and rooms -- often having to depend for real information on the privileged media personnel who had been fed unattributable news (published as views of trade officials, an euphemism for the GATT officials, or other such in relation to the US or EC) which they relay via their papers or in private conversations with the other delegates.

As of Friday noon, with all their best intentions, and in the light of the changed policies in most of the countries towards global integration and openness, the developing countries by and large have found their trading partners in industrialized countries -- particularly the two majors, US and EC, as well as Canada and Japan have shown no inclination or found time to engage in and clinch deals in bilateral market access negotiations in goods (industrial and agricultural) or in services.

The attitude of the majors was perhaps best summed up by the US and EC positions on Thursday, that having completed their own market access negotiations, both in industrial products and agriculture, they would tackle in the remaining 3-4 days other major trading partners and conclude the market access negotiations with 15-20 countries that would account for 90 percent of world trade.

They would conduct market access negotiations bilaterally with the rest of the participants -- mostly the developing countries and perhaps some of the east Europeans -- after the 15 December closure of the negotiations, at the TNC.

The EC put it in terms of "we will sweep up the rest afterwards", while the US said it will tackle individual developing countries and press them to make market access concessions and engage in the line-by-line tariff negotiations in goods where the US could get something in return for what it had already put on the table and improve their services offers/commitments.

This US/EC idea, broached on Wednesday in some official GATT consultations, was raised Thursday evening, at the daily meeting of the informal developing countries, when India and others would appear to have referred to these attempts to keep bilateral market access negotiations open after 15 December, and the dangers that individual developing countries would then face because of pressures from the majors.

At a press conference, Sutherland was asked about this and replied that verification of schedules would be possible after 15 December and that it was always open to parties to add to their concessions after 15 December but they could not withdraw it. The opportunity to pursue negotiations in the context of rectification is there he said.

Asked whether he was not placing the developing countries, as weaker negotiating partners, in an impossible situation -- where having already paid their price in terms of the texts that have been approved, and got nothing in return in market access, they would be pressured by the majors to do more -- Sutherland suggested that the negotiations would be in a multilateral context which developing countries preferred.

Later one Third World negotiator said that either Sutherland had not understood the question or seemed unable to understand the problems.

The US and EC plans to go beyond the so-called 15 Dec deadline for market access negotiations was officially sought to be sanctified and legitimised Friday by the GATT Director-General and TNC Chair, Peter Sutherland who at the Heads of Delegations meeting on Thursday night is reported to have said that after the 15 December conclusion, and till 15 February, the schedules would be open for "verification" and rectification judging the "adequacy".

This appears to have met with some objection on the ground that while there could be a process of "verification" of individual country schedules -- in terms of the tariff concessions exchanged and incorporated in the country schedules or in terms of compliance with the norms and commitments in the agreement on agriculture -- there could be no verification or rectification by making judgements about "adequacy" of the concessions and for substantive negotiations to make any individual commitments adequate.

Some developing countries explained Friday that while the "verification" process was not unusual and took place at the conclusion of every round, it was a technical one and not for substantive negotiations. Any attempt to keep the negotiations open after 15 December for substantive market access negotiations would need to be approved by consensus at the TNC and it might not be easy. Several also said that if they get no response bilaterally, they would not wait around "to be swept up" after 15 December, but would just take off the table their own offers so that they are not forced to bargain from what they had committed themselves.

But in the final analysis, one said, it all depended on the guts shown in capitals of developing countries to safeguard national interests, and how far countries are willing to go in giving up their rights to please the majors.

At least in one respect some of the NICs, who have adopted a cooperative attitude with the US and EC, and not taken a firm position in various negotiations, are finding they have to pay a new price.

They have been told to agree to give up their claims for special and differential treatment -- found in various agreements and in the proposed MTO -- and accept full graduation. The targets appear to be Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and a few others.

For quite some time in the negotiations, one of the EC officials who has the reputation of being personally sympathetic to the developing world, has been reminding journalists that in these negotiations only those with some leverage counted and those with leverage were only the US and the EC. The rest of the industrial world, even Japan and Canada, could do little except fall in line when the two decide, since both depended too much on their exports to the US and EC.

As for the developing countries, the official used to remind, one can feel sorry for their plight, but they have no negotiating leverage or power and can do very little.

Despite their massive participation in these 7-1/2 year negotiations -- an impressive 80 odd out of 112 participants, with a core of about 40 having negotiators based in Geneva -- over the last two years the developing countries have found themselves forced to mark time and wait while the US and the EC squabbled privately and publicly over their differences across a range of issues on the agenda of the Round, and engage in negotiations with the other trading partners.

From time to time, the two majors also brought in Canada and Japan -- the Quad to get endorsement and present a common front to the rest of the world. But over the last several weeks, even this earlier facade has disappeared -- with both Japan and Canada too complaining (since the Tokyo G7 summit in July) that they were not being involved.

Even as of Friday morning, two days away from the deadline to "lock" the texts of the Uruguay Round accords, trade negotiators from most of the developing countries found themselves with no interlocutors in their major trading partners with whom they could conduct line-by-line tariff negotiations to reach agreements and finalise their own schedules. And most of them were still not involved in the negotiations for changes in the DFA text -- which were concentrated in those areas where the US or EC wanted changes.

US-EC game plans

Both the US and EC, in some informal limited consultations called by the secretariat on Wednesday had sought to keep open the possibility of further bilateral market access negotiations after the conclusion of the 15 December deadline -- with the US making clear that after that date while countries could not reduce or go back on their schedules, they could always improve on them and the US hoped to persuade its trading partners to do so.

The EC was more sophisticated, with one EC source explaining that given the 3-4 days remaining, they just did not have the time to engage in negotiations with everyone of their partners, and that even if they had 36 hours in a day, realistically such negotiations could be concluded perhaps with only 10-15 countries, though they would represent 90 percent of the world trade.

The others would have to be swept up later, was the EC view.

It was also the EC view that as far as the agriculture text and its interpretations about market access -- set out in Annex 3 of Part B of the DFA in paras 11 to 15 about current access and minimum access -- the US and EC accord at Brussels had decided the issue and there was nothing further to be done.

In that part of the DFA text on agriculture (which had the title "agreement" on modalities for establishing specific commitments), the requirements included those for:

* maintaining current access opportunities (under quotas or subject to the EC's variable levies) as part of the tariffication process, and where they are expanded to be provided on an MFN basis;

* in respect of global or country specific croze, veers etc, current market access to be defined as the quantity permitted to be imported;

* minimum access to be provided on a tariff quota, mfn basis; and

* access opportunities to be provided at 4-digit (Harmonised System or HS customs classification level) or more detailed level.

Taken together the EC had interpreted these to mean that it could "cumulate" access among products at 4-digit or more detailed levels, and provide minimum access.

In practice, it could mean that a country having had a quota for subproduct AAAA in a product classification A, might find it merged with other subproduct quotas for AABB, AACC etc, in such a way that its existing access could be negated by the EC cumulating all these and rebalancing the future minimum access imports.

The US itself had originally objected to this, but in terms of the Brussels accord was bought off by being provided extra tariff quotas for pigmeat, turkey meat and a few others.

Another part of the US and EC accords has been that even in respect of the minimum access quotas after tariffication, the access provided by each of them under their preferential agreements would be counted for the minimum access. The EC could thus count all the ACP, east Europe and Mediterranean preferential imports against the minimum access -- and so could the US in respect of the NAFTA, CBI or the US-Canada Free Trade accords.

While these have been spelt out in the EC explanations of what it had won in the Brussels accord (to its members and some media in Brussels), they are not part of the disclosures here or in the Agriculture text tabled by Germain Denis on Wednesday night and tabled and virtually okayed by the heads of delegations Thursday night.

If at all the US and EC understandings are to be reflected, they might be in an additional annex that was not before the delegations or in a conference room paper which will have no legal standing after the Ministerial meeting in Marakesh, and perhaps not even after 15 December.

On Tuesday this week, after marathon negotiations in Brussels, USTR Mickey Kantor and EC Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan, came to Geneva separately and announced they had settled their differences (except for those on the audiovisual sector in services and on civil aircraft subsidy issues, on which they were still talking) but that they had brought their accords to Geneva to be multilateralised and enable the negotiations to conclude on schedule by the 15 December deadline.

They even blamed the others for the delay, in saying that other partners had been not engaging in negotiations and insisting on the US and EC first settling their disputes, and that they had done so and it was now for the others to make their contributions.

The next day, both at the market access group in goods and a small group on agriculture, the two outlined their accords -- revealing things only partially and promising to reveal those relevant to other trading partners in bilateral market access negotiations.

It quickly became clear in the agriculture area that the "multilateralisation" process meant that the others should endorse what the US and EC had agreed upon in terms of the modifications to the DFA text of December 1991 in agriculture -- as proposed in the US-EC Blair House accord of November 1992, and further modified and clarified in their Brussels accord.

The new text, put forward by Germain Denis, friend of the Chair (Sutherland), first to the key agriculture negotiators and later to a meeting of the Heads of delegations and informally approved, did not even contain the full texts. The Part B of the DFA text on agriculture -- dealing with modalities of commitments on domestic support, export subsidy/competition and market access (including full tariffication and guarantees for existing access and minimum access -- had disappeared from the text.

Delegates were advised that these wold be converted into a conference room paper -- which was expected to be made available to delegations only on Friday evening -- with no legal standing once the negotiations are concluded and the agreements are approved. The Conference Room Paper would perhaps serve as a benchmark by which the schedules of commitments in agriculture could be "verified" after 15 December, and the participants could accept or object.

Once schedules are filed and accepted, in GATT practice they can no longer be challenged or disputes raised in the future on factual grounds (of schedules and commitments not being in compliance with the text of the agreement).

And while everyone thought that at least from Thursday, the developing countries would find major partners willing to negotiate, the US and EC got embroiled in further disputes over the audio-visual sector as well as the maritime transportation -- where the US and EC seemed to have different views on what was agreed upon at Brussels over the US limited contribution to liberalisation of this sector as part of the services deal.

There were also a number of outstanding differences in rules -- on anti-dumping (where Hong Kong advised the developing country group that the US demands were being supported by the EC and Canada, in the consultations by Michael Cartland as 'friend of the chair'), on subsidies, and a number of other areas.

Some of these, and the differences among the Quad on market access -- with Japan complaining about the US-EC deals and threatening to revise its own offers -- are expected to be addressed and resolved in Geneva on Sunday. The Quad ministers are arriving in Geneva over the weekend for this.

As one Third World negotiator put it Friday afternoon: we have been waiting for weeks for the US and EC; now we will wait for the Quad on Sunday; and in the evening Sutherland will spring on us -- the texts that his 'friends of the chair' with the secretariat might decide upon.

And we will all be expected, and would in fact endorse it: none of us alone has the leverage to stand up. Developing countries collectively don't function: their capitals are afraid, and here negotiators come and let off steam at meetings that are more for getting information from others than for taking a common stand. Those who speak bravely at the developing country meetings, don't open their mouths at the HOD or TNC meetings. Most of them are instructed by capitals not to antagonise the US or EC!